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HOW ‘NECESSARY’?  
A COMPARISON OF LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENTS - 
GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS UNDER: 
ARTICLE XX(B), TBT 2.2 AND SPS 5.6 
 
KAMALA DAWAR & EYAL RONEN 
 
This paper identifies the legal and economic assessments applied to resolve 
WTO disputes requiring an assessment of the contribution of the measure to 
the objective pursued, along with identifying any reasonably available 
alternatives. It focuses on disputes encompassing an interpretation of GATT 
Article XX (b), Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) Article 5.6 
and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement Article 2.2. This 
narrow focus is because the WTO DSB has opined that there are no 
significant differences between the tests developed under Art. XX(b) of the 
GATT 1994 and Art. 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, nor that any aspect of 
the Art. XX(b) jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of the term 
"necessary" would be inapplicable to Art. 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.1 This 
provides an opportunity to compare the legal and economic assessments applied 
in disputes falling under these provisions. 
 
                                                        
 This paper is produced as part of the project ‘Dispute Settlement in Trade: Training in 
Law and Economics’ (DISSETTLE), a Marie Curie Initial Training Networks (ITN) 
Funded under the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme, Grant Agreement No FP7-
PEOPLE-2010-ITN_264633. The co-authors are Kamala Dawar University of Sussex 
School of Law and Eyal Ronen, University of Warsaw. They can be contacted at 
k.dawar[at]sussex.ac.uk, shapironen[at]gmail.com.  
1  Panel Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.20, 
WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US-Gasoline] (cited in Panel Report, EC–Asbestos, ¶ 
8.169; Panel Report, EC–Tariff Preferences, ¶ 7.197; Panel Report, Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, 
¶ 7.40). 
 This paper identifies no significant differences between the legal tests relating to 
the interpretation of the term "necessary". A WTO Panel is under no 
obligation to quantify the measure’s contribution to the objective pursued and 
‘a risk may be evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms’. However, 
the same cannot be said for the economic assessments determining whether the 
necessity of the contribution of the contested measure.  
 
After setting out the legal tests, the paper identifies those economic assessments 
undertaken to resolve disputes involving these three different GATT/WTO 
provisions. The paper finds that quantitative economic models are rarely 
employed in WTO dispute cases. The lack of coherent guidelines for assessing 
the economic dimensions of a dispute in a transparent and robust manner 
potentially undermines the effectiveness and the reputation of WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: COMPARING LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES 
 
This paper compares the available jurisprudence of the necessity test, under both 
GATT XX(b), the SPS Agreement Article 5.6 and the TBT Agreement Article 2.2. 
This comparative approach is taken in order to highlight the variations in the 
economic analysis of trade disputes despite similar legal assessments. All three of 
the GATT/WTO provisions discussed in this article address the trade 
restrictiveness of a contested measure and the findings of various Panels and 
Appellate Bodies (AB) have supported a similar approach towards these different 
provisions. The Panel in EC–Asbestos concluded that Art. 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement should not be given a radically different interpretation from Art. XX(b) 
of the GATT 1994.  Furthermore, it was unable to identify any significant 
differences between the tests that have been developed under Art. XX(b) of the 
GATT 1994 and Art. 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, or any aspect of the Art. XX(b) 
  
jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of the term "necessary" that would be 
inapplicable to Art. 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.2 
 
On the other hand, a comparison of the quantitative and qualitative economic 
analyses that were undertaken in different disputes requiring the same legal 
assessment tests, indicate otherwise. WTO tribunals have been reluctant to 
embrace quantitative economic practices in their decision-making, and rarely one 
finds economic methodologies complementing the legal analysis in dispute 
settlements. Furthermore, in WTO DSB proceedings, it has been the parties, who 
undertake such analysis. If parties include quantitative economic analysis in their 
arguments, the Panel/Appellate Body may or may not find it useful or necessary to 
their own analysis.  
 
The DS cases surveyed in this paper indicate that the tribunals often complement 
legal analysis by using purely basic economic data or descriptive evidence. Such 
analysis is certainly neither exhaustive, nor able to provide a conclusive evaluation 
of the real cost (restrictiveness) of the specific measure when imposed to achieving 
its desirable objective. Furthermore, it is insufficient to assess the trade 
restrictiveness of potential alternative measures and other economic impacts in 
realizing the same goal. A broader perspective is required in order to complement 
the legal analysis and for that economic analysis could be useful. Since empirical 
evidence are rarely submitted to the Panel or the Appellate Body, this paper 
provides several suggestive studies, which could shed light or add further insights 
to the tribunal’s adjudications. 
 
Over the past two decades, the imposition of technical and regulatory policy 
measures is increasingly expanding, especially in light of the dramatic decline in the 
use of tariffs. Evidence regarding the incidence of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) 
demonstrates that technical barriers to trade (TBTs) are by far the most frequently 
used NTM, with the average country imposing them on about 30 percent of 
products and trade. Sanitary or phytosanitary (SPS) measures are imposed on 
average on about 15 percent of trade.3 
 
The economic theory regarding the trade effects of NTMs implies that expansion 
of their use, lead to a decrease of domestic demand, hence creates trade 
restrictiveness. Albeit, NTMs may increase information and confidence provided 
to consumers, as well as willingness to pay for these goods, consequently, affect 
                                                        
2 Panel Report, US–Gasoline, ¶ 6.20 (cited in Panel Report, EC–Asbestos, ¶ 8.169; Panel 
Report, EC–Tariff Preferences, ¶ 7.197; Panel Report, Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 7.40). 
3 A. Nicita & J. Gourdon, A Preliminary Analysis on Newly Collected Data on Non-
Tariff Measures, UNCTAD POLICY ISSUES IN INT. TRADE AND COMMODITIES (2012). 
 positively on the demand for imports. The empirical literature, however, reinforces 
the negative overall impact of NTMs on imports. NTMs, in general, add on 
average an additional 87% on the restrictiveness imposed by tariffs.4 Moreover, the 
level of restrictiveness is significantly higher for exports of developing countries to 
OECD members,5 particularly in food products, which are typically subject to SPS. 
   
Considering that WTO Panel/Appellate Body is expected to evaluate whether a 
NTM is more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil its objective – a decisive and 
comparable level of trade restrictiveness is essential. Yet, measuring trade 
restrictiveness is a difficult task to perform when regulatory or technical measures 
are imposed. Unlike tariffs, for which the available quantitative databases enable 
the evaluation of their effect on various economic indicators; NTMs are more 
challenging to quantify, due to their numerous forms; qualitative nature, 
insufficient public available information and unsatisfactory transparency. As a 
result, the complexity of measuring, in a quantitative systematic manner, the 
impact of NTMs, remains a significant obstacle for their inclusions in the tribunals’ 
consideration. Nevertheless, in recent years, a significant advancement in both the 
theoretical and empirical fields could relieve this averseness, allowing to 
quantifying the impact of NTMs in various countries, sectors and even at the 
product level, while comparing to other less trade restrictive alternative measures. 
 
Several analytical approaches, which are well grounded on economic theory, were 
introduced along the years, in order to tackle this issue. Among them are price-
based techniques (i.e., price-wedge or econometric approach) and quantity-based 
methods. The price-wedge method approximates the degree to which a specific 
regulatory or policy measure raises domestic prices above international prices. 
Despite some conceptual and empirical drawbacks, this method serves as a suitable 
proxy for their restrictive impact.  
 
The most predominant approach in the relevant economic literature, which is 
present in few DS cases where quantitative analysis is provided, is the quantity-
based econometric method. It allows observing how the presence of NTMs affects 
trade, by employing statistical analysis of trade data. The approach uses gravity 
models, factor-content models or models which combine features of both – in 
order to identify the trade effects of a particular policy measure. An imperative 
requirement is a reasonable period of time prior to and after the measure has been 
                                                        
4 H. L. Kee, A. Nicita & M. Olarreaga, Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices, 119 
ECON. J. 172-199 (2009). 
5 A. C. Disdier, L. Fontagné & M. Mimouni, The Impact of Regulations on Agricultural 
Trade: Evidence from the SPS and TBT Agreements, 90(2) AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 336–350 (2008). 
  
implemented (Ex-Post analysis). Results are often expressed as tariff equivalents, 
and depend on the assumptions and specifications of the models. 
 
Moreover, in recent years, built on quantity-based approach, economic studies 
have developed novel quantitative tools, which allow measuring the trade 
restrictiveness index (TRI) of NTMs, at a very disaggregate level of HS 
classification. These instruments, which take into account the presence of many 
NTMs, provide estimations of the ad-valorem equivalents of these measures. The 
levels and changes over time, across different countries and products, may 
complement other more traditional or less accurate techniques, which were 
insufficient for the purpose of economic analysis in dispute settlements. An 
example for a recent work of this kind is the study of Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga in 
2009,6 which is based on the framework of the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) 
of Anderson and Neary in 1992 and 1994.   
 
Finally, the simulation methods, which have been long used to model the effects of 
changes in tariffs on various macroeconomic variables, are recently implemented 
for NTMs. Such simulations, which have a clearer explanation of causal factors, 
are designed as ex-ante analysis tools. They may apply static models, which 
compare specific points in time, or dynamic models (evolution from initial to the 
final equilibrium). Simulations are either based on General Equilibrium (GE) 
models, meaning linking several industries and countries, or Partial Equilibrium 
models, which analyse specific defined products or single markets.  
 
In the paper, we survey the dispute settlement cases, where some of the mentioned 
economic techniques were provided by the disputing parties. These methodologies 
are presented along with the reasoning given by the Panel/Appellate Body to the 
reluctance approach to adopt these analyses in their consideration. In addition, we 
establish that for almost each of these DS cases, the economic literature can 
provide at least one study which demonstrates how the impact of the chosen 
measure can be potentially quantified econometrically. Consequently, these 
estimations may serve in order to compare the measures’ impact to possibly less 
trade restrictive alternative measures. The paper highlights the valuable importance 
and the benefits of these methodologies in complementing the existing resolutions 
of the DSB.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6 Supra, note 4. 
 II. GATT ARTICLE XX(B)  
 
A. The ‘Necessity’ of a Non-Conforming Measure 
 
Non-compliant trade measures may be exempt from GATT/WTO rules, if 
justified under specific public interest conditions set out in GATT Article XX on 
General Exceptions. The exception assessed in this paper is paragraph (b) of 
Article XX. Pursuant to this paragraph, WTO members may adopt policy 
measures that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines, to pursue legitimate non-
trade objectives reasonably and in good faith. These measures are deemed 
“necessary” to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
 
Clearly much hinges on the interpretation determining the word ‘necessity’. The 
requirements of the necessity test, as contained in paragraph (b) of Article XX of 
GATT 1994, have been interpreted in several previous disputes.7 According to this 
body of case law, the necessity of a measure should be determined through the 
analysis of a series of factors:  
 
a)    The importance of the interests or values protected by the challenged 
measure.  
b)   The contribution of the measure to the realization of the objectives 
pursued by it. 
c)    The restrictive impact of the measure on international trade.  
 
Once these three factors have been assessed, an analysis of possible alternatives to 
the challenged measure should be undertaken and a process of ‘weighing and 
balancing’ of the factors and the alternatives should be carried out with the aim of 
determining whether the challenged measure is “necessary”. 
 
The Panel in China–Raw Materials dispute highlighted that a measure falling within 
Article XX(b) must be visibly intended to achieve the objective perused - the 
protection of health. A mere linkage is insufficient. The Panel found that China’s 
export restraints on energy-intensive, highly polluting, resource based products 
                                                        
7 Appellate Body Report, Korea –Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef, ¶ 164, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Appellate Body 
Report, Korea-Beef]; Appellate Body Report, EC–Measures affecting Asbestos, ¶ 172, 
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001); Appellate Body Report, US–Measures affecting the Cross-
Border supply of Gambling and Betting services, ¶ 306, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) 
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US-Gambling]; Appellate Body Report, Dominican 
Republic –Import and sale of Cigarettes, ¶ 70, WT/DS302/AB/R (Apr. 25, 2005). 
  
(EPRs) could not be described as measures designed to protect health. To accept 
the argument that the measure was part of a general program of pollution 
reduction would mean that Article XX(b) could “be interpreted to allow the use of 
export restrictions on any polluting products on the ground that export restrictions 
reduce the production of these products and thus pollution”.8 
 
Elsewhere in China-Rare Earths dispute, China asserted that a measure relates to 
conservation whenever the measure "contributes" to the realization of a Member's 
conservation goals. A measure's contribution to such goals might be demonstrated 
through a showing of that measure's aptness to contribute to conservation, since 
the results of regulatory actions aimed at conservation may not be immediately 
observable. The Appellate Body rejected this approach and maintained the Panel’s 
legal focus on the design and structure of the export quotas in assessing whether 
the measures relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources within the 
meaning of Article XX(g). Removing the need for economics, the AB found that 
the Panel did not err in stating that "the analysis under subparagraph (g) does not 
require an evaluation of the actual effects of the concerned measures”.  
 
A non-compliant trade measure may be justified if the Panel determines that the 
importance of the objective, through a weighing and balancing of the contribution 
of the measure and the trade restrictive impact are all assessed as necessary. This 
legal avenue and reasoning places the initial burden of proving the necessity of a 
non-conforming measure onto the responding party. 
 
B. 2.2 Assessing the Contribution of the Measure 
 
As regards factor b), the subject of this paper, the Appellate Body Report in 
Brazil–Retreaded Tyres9 stated that a measure can contribute to the stated objective 
in two different ways:  
 
(i) it can bring about a material contribution to the achievement of its 
objective; 
        or 
(ii) it can be apt to produce a material contribution to the objective pursued, 
even if the contribution is not ‘immediately observable’. 
 
                                                        
8  Panel report, China-Measures related to the exportation of various Raw Materials, ¶ 7.515, 
WT/DS394/R (July 5, 2011) [hereinafter Panel report, China-Raw Materials]. 
9   Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Measures affecting imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 151, 
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Retreaded 
Tyres]. 
 Thus, a panel may find that certain complex public health or environmental 
problems can be tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising a 
multiplicity of interacting measures. Yet there must be evidence that the measure 
can bring about a material contribution to the Member's stated objective. Indeed, 
the Appellate Body went on to define a material contribution as one which needs 
to contribute in a significant or non-marginal way to the achievement of its 
objective. To assess the degree of necessity of a measure in achieving its objective 
has also been found to be: ‘in a continuum, located significantly closer to the pole 
of “indispensable” than to the opposite pole of simply “making a contribution 
to.”’ 10   A measure could be found to contribute to the achievement of the 
objective "when there is a genuine relationship of ends and means between the 
objective pursued and the measure at issue."11  
  
Adding to this relativist approach, the Appellate Body has also expressly 
recognized that "a risk may be evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms" 
and that a Panel is under no obligation to quantify the measure’s contribution to 
the objective pursued. This was underlined in the Brazil–Retreaded Tyres dispute, 
when the Appellate Body reported that a direct statement was made to the effect 
that the contribution of the measure could be demonstrated both quantitatively 
and/or qualitatively: 
 "Such a demonstration can of course be made by resorting to evidence or data, pertaining to 
the past or the present, that establish that the import ban at issue makes a material 
contribution to the protection of public health or environmental objectives pursued. This is not, 
however, the only type of demonstration that could establish such a contribution… …[A] 
demonstration could consist of quantitative projections in the future, or qualitative reasoning 
based on a set of hypotheses that are tested and supported by sufficient evidence."12   
 
Brazil defended its objective of reducing exposure to the risks to human, animal, 
and plant life and health arising from the accumulation of waste tyres under 
paragraph (b) of Article XX of the GATT 1994 stating that Brazil's chosen level of 
protection is the "reduction of the risks of waste tyre accumulation to the 
maximum extent possible". The Panel then assessed whether the import ban (i) 
can contribute to reduction in the number of waste tyres generated in Brazil; and 
(ii) a reduction in the number of waste tyres can contribute to the reduction of the 
risks to human, animal, and plant life and health arising from waste tyres. The 
Panel examined the replacement of imported retreaded tyres with new tyres on 
                                                        
10  Appellate Body Report, Korea –Beef, ¶ 161. 
11  Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 145. 
12  Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 151. 
  
Brazil's market and determined that all types of retreaded tyres have by definition a 
shorter lifespan than new tyres. Accordingly, "an import ban on retreaded tyres 
may lead to a reduction in the total number of waste tyres because imported 
verified the link between the replacement of imported retreaded tyres with 
domestically retreaded tyres and a reduction in the number of waste tyres in Brazil. 
If retreaded tyres are manufactured in Brazil from tyres used in Brazil, the 
retreading of these used tyres contributes to the reduction of the accumulation of 
waste tyres in Brazil by “giving a second life to some used tyres, which otherwise 
would have become waste immediately after their first and only life.”   
 
The Panel chose to conduct a qualitative analysis of the contribution of the Import 
Ban to the achievement of its objective, which was within the bounds of the 
latitude it enjoys in choosing a methodology for the analysis of the contribution. In 
the course of its reasoning, the Panel tested some key hypotheses, including that:  
• imported retreaded tyres are replaced with new tyres and domestically 
retreaded tyres; 
• some proportion of domestic used tyres are retreadable and are being 
retreaded; 
• Brazil introduced a number of measures to facilitate the access of domestic 
retreaders to good-quality used tyres; 
• more automotive inspections in Brazil lead to an increase in the number of 
retreadable used tyres; and 
• Brazil has the production capacity to retread such tyres. 
 
The Panel concluded that the prohibition on the importation of retreaded tyres is 
capable of making a contribution to the objective pursued by Brazil, in that it can 
lead to a reduction in the overall number of waste tyres generated in Brazil, which 
in turn can reduce the potential for exposure to the specific risks to human, 
animal, plant life and health that Brazil seeks to address. The Panel also agreed that 
Brazil has taken a series of measures to facilitate the access of domestic retreaders 
to good-quality used tyres, and that new tyres sold in Brazil are high-quality tyres 
that comply with international standards and have the potential to be retreaded.  
 
Bown and Trachtman criticize the WTO jurisprudence in the Brazil–Retreaded Tyres 
dispute, for its failure to evaluate the types of concerns that an economic welfare 
analysis would provide.13 The Panel should have estimated, in quantitative terms, 
the reduction of waste tyres that would result from the Import Ban, or the time 
                                                        
13 C. P. Bown, & J. P. Trachtman, Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres: 
A Balancing Act, 8(01) WORLD TRADE REV. 85–135 (2009). 
 horizon of such a reduction. Without examining any empirical data, nor 
estimations on magnitudes, on the contribution of the import ban to the objective 
perused, it is impossible to make a rational judgment of the utility of the Brazilian 
policies contested. They suggest that if the justification for the import ban was 
grounded on the argument that it was a second-best Brazilian policy designed to 
combat a large externality, then Brazil’s failure to impose a ban on used-tyre 
imports weakens its effectiveness by eroding potential welfare gains through a 
reduction in equilibrium production (and consumption) of Brazilian retreaded 
tyres. Moreover, the MERCOSURs’ exemption from the ban has the same impact 
as weakening the possible environmental externality benefit of the import ban. 
 
Returning to the reasoning in the China-Raw Materials dispute, the export 
restrictions on various raw materials were defended under Article XX(b) as 
intended to make a material contribution to reduce health risks associated with 
pollution generated by the production of specific raw materials.  The economic 
rationale put forward was that under normal economic conditions, export 
restrictions would reduce the demand for exports, which decreases domestic 
production and, in turn, the pollution associated with its production. Furthermore, 
China argued that, in the long term, high world market prices would provide an 
incentive to new producers to enter the market, consequently reduce the world 
prices to their initial level. China submitted supporting evidence using both 
regression analyses and simulation models. The Panel found that the fact that in 
the long run the trade-restrictive effects of a measure may vanish does not imply 
that the short-term costs associated with the measure are not highly restrictive. The 
Panel upheld the claimant’s challenge that the health-friendly description of the 
export duties was a mere ex-post facto rationalization of measures that were not 
originally designed to protect health.  
 
The Panel found that China’s quantitative analysis was problematic on the various 
grounds.14 First, the highly speculative estimations, and lack of adequate data used 
in the economic analysis. Second, the inaccurate specifications of the estimated 
regression models such as control variables, as consumption and production, 
which are affected by the very export restrictions being examined. The most 
significant criticism was also directed at the unreasonable resemblance between 
domestic supply and demand elasticities for all EPR products. China had failed to 
establish that production technologies for the raw materials and the degree with 
which firms in the downstream sector can substitute these raw materials with other 
inputs, similarly across products. For that, the Panel found the analysis insufficient 
                                                        
14 Panel Report, China–Raw Materials, ¶ 7.531-7.538. 
  
to account for critical upstream-downstream interactions. The latter is particularly 
important since the impact of China’s export restrictions on domestic prices is 
affected by China’s dominant role as an exporter of raw materials. As China’s 
prices have been consistently lower than the international prices over the years, 
preserving this gap clearly offers an advantage to the domestic downstream 
manufacturing sectors over foreign producers. 
 
China also built on past empirical evidence that corresponds with the 
"Environmental Kuznets Curve" (EKC) theory, which suggests that as economic 
development takes place, environmental degradation increases until a certain point, 
and then decreases with the rise in GDP per capita. The Panel stated that even 
assuming that export restrictions could help generate the required discovery 
externalities and growth in the metal industries, it cannot prove a causal linkage 
from economic growth to environmental quality. 15  Particularly it does not 
necessarily mean that imposition of export restrictions on EPR products will be 
translated into long-term economic growth, which in turn achieves environmental 
protection. The Panel concluded that the evidence submitted did not prove that 
the export restrictions made a material contribution to the protection of health. 
Regarding possible ‘future contribution’ of the policy objective, the Panel disagreed 
that these measures could increase national growth and welfare, and consequently 
raise the level of health protection. Subsequently, the Panel went on arguendo, to 
prove that in any event the measures could not pass the least-trade restrictive 
means test. 
 
Charlier & Guillou  examined the effects of an export quota on quantities, prices 
and price distortion, based on the China-Raw Materials dispute, using a model of a 
monopoly extracting a non-renewable resource and selling it on both the domestic 
and foreign markets.16 The empirical results highlight the importance of demand 
elasticities, for each heterogenic product, as suggested by the Panel in the dispute. 
It provides estimations of import demand elasticity for each product concerned in 
the case (at the HS6 level). Moreover, they challenge the proposition that an export 
quota always favours conservation of natural resource, and that a higher foreign 
price necessarily follows this policy and inherently increases price distortion and 
therefore discrimination. Among the products concerned, two groups should be 
differentiated depending on China’s export market power. When China is a 
significant exporter, there is no evident sign of the distortionary effect by the 
export quota. However, as a weak exporter, but a strong producer and consumer, 
there is evidence according to which China is imposing an inefficient quota. 
                                                        
15  Panel Report, China–Raw Materials, ¶ 7.551-7.553. 
16 C. Charlier & S. Guillou, Distortion effects of export quota policy: an analysis of the 
China-Raw Materials dispute, 31 CHINA ECON. REV. 320–338 (2014). 
  
Despite several differences, driven by the characteristics of the two dispute cases, 
and the quantitative evidence provided, the Panel has reached relatively similar 
conclusions in China-Rare Earths dispute. China justified export duties that violated 
Paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO, by alleging that these 
duties were justifiable under the scope of Article XX(b).” 17  While the Panel 
admitted that it was provided with sufficient evidence to substantiate that the 
mining and production of rare earths caused grave harm to the environment, 
health of humans, animals and plants in China, it was not convinced by China’s 
quantitative or qualitative arguments. Particularly, China failed to prove that the 
export duties were specifically designed to reduce the environmental pollution; 
make a material contribution to achieve pollution reduction; establish causal 
linkage between the duties and the objective perused; relate the actual 
environmental impacts of the export duties on rare earths with that of “reasonably 
available” measures. 
  
China’s arguments were supported by Prof. Jaime de Melo’s economic report 
"Selected Economic Issues Regarding Export Quotas and Production Quotas".18  
These claims were confronted with an economic analysis of Prof. L. Alan 
Winters. 19  Both economic experts agreed that a binding production quota 
introduced in isolation is likely to reduce both exports and domestic consumption 
relative to the unrestricted trade situation, as both export and domestic prices 
would be driven up. However, the experts disagreed on the nature of the 
interaction between production quotas and export quotas that would be necessary 
to ensure that no "perverse signals" are sent by the export quotas.  
 
The Panel rejected China’s arguments while expressing concerns regarding the 
reliability of the data and methodology with respect to the gap between foreign and 
domestic prices, and found the position of the complainants more convincing, 
based on a supportive analysis by Prof. Grossman.20 According to this, a tax levied 
on exports causes an increase in foreign markets prices, and a fall in price in the 
home market. The increase in domestic consumption would offset the fall in 
foreign consumption. The Panel concluded that the fall in China’s foreign exports 
of rare earths would indeed be offset by the increase in domestic consumption of 
                                                        
17  Panel Report, China–Measures relating to exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, 
¶ 7.172, WT/DS431/R (Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Panel Report, China – Rare Earths]. 
18  China – Rare Earths, Exhibit CHN-157. 
19  China – Rare Earths, Exhibit JE-169. 
20   China – Rare Earths, Exhibit JE-164, “Export Duties as a Means to Address 
Environmental Externalities”. 
  
rare earths as to negate any possible pollution reduction effects of the challenged 
measures. 21  In the case above, the Panel was expected to determine which 
particular economic evidence and methodologies are more reliable and should 
therefore be trusted. In turn, this reaffirms the imperative role of a well-grounded 
quantitative analysis in complementing the legal arguments, in similar future 
disputes.  
 
C. Assessing Less Trade Restrictive Alternative Measures  
 
If the preliminary analysis under Article XX(b) on the contribution of the measure 
to the objective pursued yields an initial conclusion that the measure is necessary, 
the result must be confirmed by comparing the challenged measure with possible 
alternatives suggested by the complainants.22  Further, that in order to qualify as an 
alternative, a measure must be not only less trade restrictive than the challenged 
policy measure, but should also preserve for the responding Member its right to 
achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued.23    
 
The mere existence of an alternative measure is not sufficient to prove that the 
disputed measure is not "necessary". Citing US–Gambling,24 the Appellate Body in 
Brazil–Retreaded Tyres confirmed that a proposed alternative must preserve a 
Members’ “right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the 
objective pursued”. If the respondent demonstrates that the measure proposed is 
not a genuine alternative, or is not ‘reasonably available’, the measure at issue is to 
be deemed necessary.25 Moreover, such alternative cannot be "merely theoretical in 
nature, for instance, where the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or 
where the measure imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive 
costs or substantial technical difficulties."26   
 
In Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, the EU suggested two possible alternative measures or 
practices: (1) measures to reduce the number of waste tyres accumulating in Brazil; 
(2) measures or practices to improve the domestic management of waste tyres.  
                                                        
21  Panel Report, China–Rare Earths, ¶ 7.178. 
22  The AB Reports for several disputes have confirmed that it rests upon the complaining 
Member to identify possible alternatives: US–Gambling; Brazil–Retreaded Tyres; China–
Measures affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009).  
23 Appellate Body Reports: US–Gambling, ¶ 309 and Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 156. 
24 Appellate Body Report, US–Gambling, ¶ 308. 
25 Appellate Body Reports: Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 156; US–Gambling, ¶ 307; Korea–Beef, 
¶ 166. 
26 Appellate Body Report, US–Gambling, ¶ 308. 
 The Panel rejected them as reasonably available alternatives to the Import Ban 
since: the proposed alternatives were already in place and have not achieved 
Brazil’s chosen level of protection, or would carry their own risks and hazards. Yet, 
certain “estimates would have been very useful and, undoubtedly, would have 
strengthened the foundation of the Panel’s findings.” Bown and Trachtman argue 
however, that the Panel/Appellate Body reached their conclusions using 
unsatisfactory statements, rather than pursuing the best available evidence.27 The 
WTO thus ignored its mandate of identifying the existence of less treaty 
inconsistent or trade restrictive alternatives that would contribute equivalently to 
the achievement of the relevant goal.  
 
Furthermore, in their welfare-economic analysis, Bown and Trachtman suggest 
examining the effects of two possible alternative measures.28 The first-best policy 
measure involves a production subsidy on retreads of once-used Brazilian tyres, 
equal to the size of the environmental externality, which Brazil aims to correct. 
Such measure incentivizes retreading additional tyres that would not otherwise 
have been retreaded. The reason for that is the relatively low price received by 
producers, as the market was not compensating them for the external societal 
benefit associated with retreading. Their model indicates that though consumers 
do not benefit from a change in price, and the level of imports decreases, domestic 
producers will increase their manufacturing to the socially optimal level. Moreover, 
such measure is anticipated to contribute positively to Brazil’s total welfare.  The 
second-best policy measure was levying a tariff on imports of retreads. Similarly to 
the previous proposed measure, domestic producers are encouraged to retread 
more of the stock of once-used Brazilian tyres. Yet, consumers face a higher price, 
and consequently reduce their imports even more compared to the production 
subsidy. The authors suggest that such trade policy can be welfare improving to 
Brazil, when the externality gains are large and the by-product (consumption) 
distortion losses associated with the import tariff are small.    
 
Both of the alternative policies are less restrictive than a full ban, and capable of 
achieving Brazil’s goal to the same extent as an import ban. However, each may 
raise questions regarding their “reasonable availability”. A production subsidy may 
potentially discriminate or impose a restriction on imported tyres, which violate 
Articles III and IX of GATT (respectively). Moreover, such measures may involve 
establishing a costly and often too administratively complex tax collection scheme 
that would later provide the exact production subsidy. An additional difficulty, 
involves verifying that the once-used tyres being retreaded, which are entitled to 
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receive subsidy, were consumed in Brazil and not elsewhere while later imported to 
Brazil. Nevertheless, this economic analysis provides a theoretical framework, 
assessing potential alternative measures employed in similar disputes.  
 
In the EC-Asbestos dispute, Canada argued that the Decree was an excessive 
measure in view of the fact that controlled use is a less trade-restrictive alternative 
that enables the French objective of protecting human health to be attained.29 
Neither the preamble to the TBT Agreement nor the precautionary principle can 
justify the measure taken by the French Government in breach of the obligations 
contained in the TBT Agreement. Moreover, Canada claimed that Frances’ risk 
assessment is based on hypothetical data and therefore has no real factual relation 
to the situation actually prevailing in France, while often misleading to base it on 
data from exposure to amphiboles or mixed fibres, instead of to chrysotile fibres 
alone. The extrapolations from data based on high exposure levels and exposures 
to friable products greatly exaggerates the risk from low exposure levels to 
products where chrysotile is encapsulated in a hard matrix, specifically chrysotile-
cement and friction products.  The analysis of reasonably available alternatives 
included the question of whether controlled use of asbestos: 
 
(a) is sufficiently effective in the light of France's health policy objectives 
and 
(b) constitutes a reasonably available measure. 
 
The Panel considered that the evidence tends to show that handling chrysotile-
cement products constitutes a risk to health rather than the opposite. Accordingly, 
a decision-maker responsible for taking public health measures might reasonably 
conclude that the presence of chrysotile-cement products posed a risk because of 
the risks involved in working with those products. Accordingly, the Panel 
concluded that the EC has made a prima facie case for the existence of a health 
risk in connection with the use of chrysotile, in particular as regards lung cancer. 
Furthermore, it was noted that the levels of protection obtained by following 
international standards, whether it be the ISO standard or the WHO Convention, 
are lower than those established by France, including those applicable before the 
introduction of the Decree. Considering the high level of risk identified, France's 
objective, which the Panel could not question, justified the adoption of exposure 
ceilings lower than those for which the international conventions provided. The 
Appellate Body report therefore found that controlled use is not a reasonably 
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 available alternative in all the other sectors in which workers may be exposed to 
chrysotile. 
 
In the case of China-raw materials, the Panel acknowledged that the measures in 
place (export restrictions) are less restrictive in most of the EPR products than full 
"bans" would be.30  However, the Panel rejected China's claims that the policy 
measures are not restrictive, since the effect of an export restrictions on the world 
market does not depend on the world availability of the raw natural resources 
needed to manufacture EPR products, but on a country's export market share in 
the EPR market. Economic evidence proves that China's share of global exports in 
some of these products is significant, hence even unassertive measures would have 
a substantial impact. The complainants suggested six available WTO-consistent 
less trade-restrictive alternative measures that could ensure reduction of pollution 
and protection of health. The Panel agreed to undertake an arguendo analysis of 
the measures, which consist: (i) investment in more environmentally friendly 
technologies; (ii) further encouragement and promotion of recycling of consumer 
goods; (iii) increasing environmental standards; (iv) investing in "infrastructure 
necessary to facilitate recycling scrap"; (v) stimulating greater local demand for 
scrap material without discouraging local supply; and (vi) introducing production 
restrictions or pollution controls on primary production.  
 
China responded that these suggested measures are already in place in China, and 
export restrictions complement them in order to achieve a better environmental 
protection. The Panel stated that China has not been able to provide evidence that 
these measures are actually implemented, while simply showing guidelines or plans 
cannot substitute mandatory obligations. Secondly, China did not justify why the 
proposed alternatives, could not be sufficient to achieve the objective stated or 
stand-alone without additional export restrictions.31 Based on the examination of 
the three factors determining whether the measures were “necessary” and the 
assessment of less trade restrictive alternative measures, the Panel found that 
China’s claims for using the export restrictions were not sufficiently justified. 
China did not to appeal the Panel’s decisions under Article XX(b). 
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III. SPS ARTICLE 5.6 
 
A. 3.1 The Scope of Article 5.6 
 
Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement provides that: 
“[W]hen establishing or maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve the 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such 
measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their adequate level of sanitary 
or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.” 
 
The footnote to this provision reads as follows: 
 
“For purpose of paragraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not more trade-restrictive than 
required unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking into account technical 
and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary less 
restrictive to trade.” 
 
Article 5.6 adopts a least trade restrictive alternatives test where, like the same test 
under Article XX(b) of the GATT, the less trade restrictive alternatives are 
regarded as reasonably available only when they are economically feasible and can 
accomplish the same levels of protection which the measures invoked by 
defending parties can achieve. Marceau & Trachtman, however, identify a 
significant difference, which unlike the assessment of necessity under Article XX 
of the GATT, the evaluation under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement does not 
include consideration of the degree of the measure’s contribution to the end 
pursued.32  
 
In Australia-Salmon and Japan-Apples, the Appellate Body found that all of the 
following three factors have to be shown in order to establish a violation of Article 
5.6: 
1) There is at least one alternative, which is reasonably available, taking into 
account technical and economic feasibility;  
2) The alternatives can achieve the Member's appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection;  
3) The alternative is significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure 
in dispute. 
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 In Australia–Salmon, the Appellate Body affirmed that determining the appropriate 
level of protection is the right of the Member concerned, and not of the WTO 
tribunals. However, determining the level of protection should be done before 
adopting the measure, with sufficient precision. Otherwise, the Panel may 
determine its level of protection on the basis of the measure itself. In this dispute, 
Australia expressed its level of protection as ‘very conservative’, but the Panel 
instead assessed it as ‘zero-risk’ on the basis that the measure itself was a total ban. 
Moreover, since Article 5.6 ignores balancing the contribution to a legitimate 
objective, the tribunal need not reject the use of a measure merely because it did 
not adequately contribute to its objective and is highly trade restrictive. In the 
absence of a reasonably available alternative, a measure will be considered as 
consistent with the provision.  
 
Additionally, in Article 5.6, the complainant must raise a prima facie case that the 
measure infringes them before the burden switches to the respondent to provide a 
rebuttal. Under the general exceptions, the complainant only needs to propose a 
measure to activate the respondent’s burden of proving that it is not reasonably 
available. As the subject matter of the SPS Agreement typically applies to measures 
designed to achieve protection of health, the complainant’s burden will often 
require it to prove detailed technical matters demonstrating that its proposed 
alternative would achieve the respondent’s level of protection. 
 
As indicated, under the SPS Agreement, a non-compliant measure may be justified, 
not unlike Article XX(b) exception, in order to achieve a desired level of 
protection. The interpretation of the legal requirements of Article 5.6 SPS is similar 
to those under Article XX(b). The complainant must first demonstrate that there is 
a prima facie case that the measure infringes the relevant provision, before the 
burden switches to the respondent to provide a rebuttal. The complainant then 
needs to propose a reasonably available alternative measure. 
 
B. 3.2 Assessing Trade Restrictiveness of a Measure and Possible Alternatives 
 
In Australia-Salmon, the contested measure imposed by Australia (certain heat 
treatment requirements) prohibits the importation of fresh, chilled or frozen 
salmon. The Panel stated that the possible alternatives, which would be compared 
with the import ban of the raw salmon concerned, were five measures, identified, 
in the Australian 1996 Final Report. Whereas, Canada noted four alternative 
options are significantly less trade restrictive, Australia argued that the feasibility of 
one measure may be reliant on the existence of another, therefore individual 
  
measures or sets of measures are not technically and economically feasible in 
practice.33 Moreover, some of the options were clearly less trade-restrictive than 
the import ban/heat treatment requirement. While the Panel found that less trade-
restrictive measures existed, and could have been used by Australia,34 the Appellate 
Body reversed the ruling on grounds that the Panel did not evaluate or assess the 
alternative’ measures relative effectiveness in reducing the overall disease risk. 
Furthermore, it had based its considerations on the heat-treatment requirement, 
and not on the import prohibition. Yet because of these insufficient factual 
findings, the Appellate Body found itself unable to conclude whether Australia had 
violated Article 5.6. 
 
In Australia-apples, the Panel stated that the reasoning articulated in Australia's risk 
assessment, with respect to the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread of fire 
blight, including estimation of the value for the respective probabilities, does not 
rely on adequate scientific evidence and, accordingly, is not coherent and 
objective. 35  The Panel agreed with New Zealand’s’ assertions that the 
methodological flaws result in a situation where the risk assessment overestimates 
the overall probability of the entry, establishment and spread of fire blight in this 
dispute. Moreover, the importation of mature, symptomless apples, suggested by 
New Zealand, was an appropriate alternative for Australia's eight fire blight and 
four European canker measures, and that the inspection of a 600-unit sample from 
each import lot was an appropriate alternative for Australia's ALCM measure.  
 
In its appeal, Australia’s submitted a Final Import Risk Analysis Report for Apples from 
New Zealand ("IRA"). This risk assessment was "semi-quantitative" in that, for each 
pest, it combined a quantitative assessment of the likelihood of entry, 
establishment and spread with a qualitative assessment of the likely associated 
potential biological and economic consequences. The combination of these 
probability assessments then yield an overall determination of "unrestricted risk", 
that is, the risk associated with the importation of apples from New Zealand in the 
absence of any risk management measures. The IRA Report, responded to New-
Zealand’s claims regarding the imposition of the SPS measures in the Australia-
Apples case, although it did not allow a genuine assessment of the restrictiveness of 
the measure, or possible alternatives. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body reversed 
the Panel's findings of inconsistency in regard to the measures relating to these two 
pests. 
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An economic analysis which was undertaken by Yue and Beghin reaffirms New 
Zealand’s claims. It estimates the tariff equivalent and trade effects when there is 
no trade flow of a commodity due to the presence of a quarantine non-tariff 
measure (i.e. imports ban).36Their solution yields demand functions influenced by 
prices (include transportation costs, tariffs and the tariff equivalent of the technical 
barriers) and a random component. This yields likelihood functions of 
consumption levels of the commodity in the countries involved and other 
countries that depend on prices in those countries. Their application suggests that 
the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of the ban by Australia on New-Zealand’s apples 
is, on average, about 99% of the fob price inclusive of transportation costs. 
 
In Japan-Apples, the ‘Least Trade Restrictive Alternative’ analysis under Article 5.6 
of the SPS Agreement was seen to have been a relatively moderate one, as 
compared with that of Article XX (b) of the GATT. In this dispute, the Japanese 
varietal testing requirement was compared with "testing by product", as a less trade 
restrictive alternative. The Panel found that Japan acted inconsistently with Article. 
5.6 since the measure was more trade-restrictive than required to achieve the 
appropriate level of SPS protection. It concluded that this alternative measure: (i) 
was reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility; (ii) 
achieved Japan's appropriate level of SPS protection; and (iii) was significantly less 
restrictive to trade than the SPS measure at issue, confirming the 3-pronged test. 
 
The Panel’s ruling is reinforced by an econometric analysis of Calvin & Krissoff, 
who quantify the restrictiveness of the SPS measures that Japan imposed on apple 
imports from the US.37 They measured the trade and welfare impacts of reducing 
trade barriers, building on a partial equilibrium (PE), two-equation framework that 
endogenously determines the SPS tariff-rate equivalent and the level of trade. Their 
estimates of ad-valorem equivalent of the Japanese technical measures, using the 
price wedge approach, are around 27%, hence significantly more critical than 
tariffs in restricting imports. They suggest that these measures serve mainly as a 
protectionist instrument for shielding domestic producers of Fuji apples.  
 
A follow-up analysis, by Calvin et al, indicates the economic costs of Japans’ SPS 
measures on US apples.38 They estimate the transaction cost (𝑘 = 33) and SPS 
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measures (𝐶𝑃𝑃 = 15) at cents per pounds. Using these results and the exporter’s 
price (𝑃𝑢𝑠 = 50), the tariff equivalent of SPS is estimated to be approximately 
18.1%. Honda uses similar methodology to that suggested by Yue and Beghin for 
Australia39 and suggests that Japan’s SPS measures impose a significantly higher 
restrictiveness on U.S. apples, which has an average effect over the entire period of 
118.9%.40 These results imply that other suggested methodologies for quantifying 
tariff equivalents of Japanese SPS on U.S. apple imports have been 
underestimated. 
 
IV. TBT ARTICLE 2.2 
 
A. Application of Technical Regulations under Article 2.2   
 
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement establishes: 
 
"Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a 
view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  For this 
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.  Such legitimate 
objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; 
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In 
assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and 
technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products." 
The resemblance in much of the wordings to GATT general exceptions has 
resulted in Appellate Body jurisprudence on TBT Article 2.2 being closely aligned 
with Article XX(b). When determining if the challenged measure is more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective under Article 2.2, the 
Appellate Body has established a test very similar to the necessity test under the 
general exceptions. First, the Panel is required to weigh and balance the trade-
restrictiveness of the regulation with its contribution to the legitimate objective, 
and the risks that non-fulfilment creates. 41  Second, if the measure is found 
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 necessary, the Panel will consider whether there are any reasonably available less-
trade restrictive alternatives, which could make an equal contribution to the 
objective42 Accordingly, the Panel should take account of ‘the nature of the risks at 
issue and the gravity of the consequences that would arise from non-fulfilment’43. 
The main differences between the two provisions are the following: First, the 
burden of proof to establish the violation of Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement lies 
with the complainant. This in in contrast to GATT Article XX, where the 
respondent bears the burden of establishing the justification for what else would 
be a violation.44 Second, while Article 2.2 contains a non-exhaustive list of the 
‘legitimate objectives’, the general exceptions contain only the base on which an 
exception can be established.45 Third, it is only in Article 2.2, that the risks of non-
fulfilment of the relevant objective is required to be considered in determining 
whether a TBT measure is more trade-restrictive than necessary. 
This section completes the proposition underpinning this article, that under the 
TBT Agreement, a non-compliant measure may be justified, not unlike the 
exception under Article XX(b) and Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. A very 
similar interpretation of the legal requirements has been explicitly followed by the 
DSB under Article XX(b). Indeed, the WTO DSB has opined that there are no 
significant differences between the tests developed under Art. XX(b) of the GATT 
1994 and Art. 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, nor that any aspect of the Art. XX(b) 
jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of the term "necessary" would be 
inapplicable to Article. 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.46 
 
B. Assessment of Trade Restrictiveness of a Measure 
 
In the US-Clove Cigarettes, the Panel found a solid basis for justifying the imposition 
of the measure, as it makes a material contribution to the identified objective. This 
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finding was supported by numerous of scientific and quantitative evidence, which 
were submitted by the respondent party.47  Subsequently, the Panel decided to 
compare the measure with several less restrictive alternatives measures, suggested 
by Indonesia. Among these measures were: adopting provisions to limit cigarette 
companies from engaging in practices targeting youth and adopting various 
measures set out in the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control aimed 
at preventing cigarette sales to minors.48 Yet the Panel’s assessment rested on pure 
legal analysis, without complementary economic evidence on the level of 
restrictiveness of the proposed measures, or on their success in achieving the 
objective perused. Based on this narrow legal focus, the Panel found that 
Indonesia failed to prove that its proposed alternative measures could reduce the 
relevant health risks to the same extent as the US measure. 
 
In the US-Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL), the Panel ruled that the US 
did not meaningfully inform consumers about the countries of origin with respect 
of meat products. It asserted that the labels identifying multiple countries of origin 
could confuse or mislead, rather than inform, consumers. Moreover, the Panel 
stated that the COOL implementation is more trade restrictive than is necessary to 
fulfil its objective, and therefore violates Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement. The 
Panel indicated that the focus of an assessment of trade-restrictiveness should be 
the impact on competitive opportunities: 
[T]he scope of the term ‘trade-restrictive’ is broad ... [and] does not require the demonstration 
of any actual trade effects, as the focus is on the competitive opportunities available to imported 
products... 49  . [T]he COOL measure negatively affects imported livestock’s conditions of 
competition in the US market in relation to domestic livestock by imposing higher segregation 
costs on imported livestock.50 
 
The term ‘competitive opportunities’ is often used in contradistinction to trade 
effects; emphasising the importance of market access to potential imports. 
Nevertheless, the Panel declared that the COOL measure had ‘brought about 
actual negative trade effects on imported livestock as shown by a significant and 
negative impact on import shares and prices’.51 The US provided the Panel with an 
econometric study52 , prepared by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
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 focusing on imports from the Canadian and Mexican fed and feeder cattle market. 
The study indicates that the price gap between Canada and US’s livestock 
decreased subsequent to the implementation of the COOL. The estimators of the 
COOL measure on the import ratio of Canadian livestock were found to be 
negatively correlated, although not significantly far from zero. Furthermore, it 
showed that the US economic recession is the primary cause for the decline in 
Canada import shares. The Panel also reviewed two econometric analyses, 
submitted by Canada, namely the ‘Informa Study’53 and the ‘Sumner Econometric 
Study’. The ‘Informa Study’ focused on the how different types of compliance and 
segregation costs, of the COOL measure, are allocated along the supply chains. It 
showed that these costs depend on a large number of variables, among them the 
production fragmentation, the stage of the supply chain, size of the firm, and 
others. The compliance costs increase as livestock and meat move downstream on 
the chain. The second analysis described an economic model simulation of the US 
livestock sector to illustrate how the differential implementation costs of the 
COOL measure are distributed among market participants through market forces. 
It emphasised the readiness of economic operators along the supply chain to pay 
for mixed origin beef and hog, along a comparison of the behaviour of consumers, 
prior and post the imposition of the COOL measure. The implementation of the 
COOL requirements, leads to a reduction of the willingness to pay by the 
operators along the supply chain for given quantities of Canadian cattle and hogs. 
 
The Panel stated that it could not genuinely assess, the reliability and precision of 
the estimations in the studies proposed by both sides. Yet, Canada’s reports were 
“sufficiently robust” to prove the causal impact of COOL in reducing competitive 
opportunities for Canadian exporters. It accepted that the segregation costs lead 
traders towards privileging US-origin livestock, consequently create a negative and 
significant impact on Canadian import shares and prices. The US challenged this 
two-step approach, arguing that the Panel went beyond the scope of Article 2.2, to 
make an “intrusive and far-ranging judgment” on whether COOL “is effective 
public policy.” Instead it should have focused only on whether COOL is more 
trade-restrictive than necessary. Although upholding the Panel’s ruling with regards 
the legitimacy of the measure’s objective, the Appellate Body found the Panel’s 
had incorrectly decided that a measure could be consistent with Article 2.2 only if 
it fulfilled its objective completely or exceeded some minimum level of fulfilment. 
It has ignored its own findings, which demonstrated that the COOL measure does 
contribute, at least to some extent, to achieving its objective. Although reversing 
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the Panel’s finding that COOL is inconsistent with Article 2.2, the Appellate Body 
was not able to determine whether COOL is more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to meet the TBT requirement that it be a legitimate objective. The Appellate Body 
did not complete its analysis, since it lacked the necessary evidentiary information. 
It should also be noted that with respect to the less trade-restrictive alternative 
measures, the Panel never reached the stage of comparing the COOL measure 
against less trade restrictive alternative measures, since the COOL measure "does 
not fulfil the identified objective within the meaning of Article 2.2, as “it fails to 
convey meaningful origin information to consumers", therefore violates Article 2.2 
of the TBT agreement. 
 
Pouliot & Sumner highlight that the relative sizes of the impacts of COOL on 
quantities and prices depend significantly on Canada’s export supply elasticity.54 
Given the conditions on demand and supply in Canada, the export supply of fed 
cattle should be less elastic than the export supply for feeder cattle. Subsequently, 
the model predicts that a strong effect of COOL on price in the fed cattle market, 
and strong effect of COOL on import quantity ratios in the feeder cattle market. 
The empirical results show statistically significant effects of COOL that are 
consistent with the expectations from the theoretical model. In the fed cattle 
market, results show a significant widening of the basis from COOL while smaller 
and less significant effects on the ratio of imports to domestic use. In the market 
for feeder cattle, they found less significant results for the price, but significant 
reductions in the import ratios. Overall, the implementation of COOL had a 
significant differential effect on the cattle market in Canada versus the US 
domestic cattle market. 
 
Twine & Rude assert the impact of the COOL measure from a slightly different 
angle.55 The authors propose a multi-market partial equilibrium model in order to 
simulate the impact of several exogenous shocks, on the economic performance of 
Canadian and US beef cattle industries. These include: feed price escalation, 
mandatory COOL requirements, and economic recession. Their empirical results 
demonstrate that the impacts on the US industry are relatively small compared to 
those on the Canadian industry. Moreover, the COOL measure and feed price 
escalation, account for the largest negative impact on the Canadian cattle industry. 
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 These simulations reinforce the WTO tribunal’s findings with respect to the trade 
restrictiveness of the COOL measure. 
 
C. The Contribution of the Tuna-Dolphin Dispute 
 
In many respects, the US-Tuna II (Mexico) dispute is a unique example. First, this 
case was the first time, in nearly 200 WTO rulings, that the Panel found a violation 
under Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement. More importantly, the dispute exemplifies 
the difficulties faced by the DSM when disputes involve contentious quantitative 
submissions in the form of existing qualitative studies. For after determining 
whether the US dolphin safe provisions fulfilled a legitimate objective, the Panel 
was also called upon to determine whether the contribution of provisions to the 
US objective (of ensuring that consumers are not misled about whether the tuna 
contained in tuna products was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins) 
are more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil such objective, taking account of 
the risks non-fulfilment would create.56    
 
The only piece of evidence presented in these proceedings to ascertain what US 
consumers in fact understand the terms "dolphin-safe" to mean is an opinion poll 
submitted by Mexico.57  This poll shows that 48 per cent of the 800 individuals 
surveyed believe that "dolphin safe" means that "no dolphins were killed or 
injured" while 12 per cent believe that it means that "dolphins were not encircled 
and then released to capture the tuna". The Panel found that in light of the poll, it 
is not clear that US consumers understand the term "dolphin-safe" to mean the 
same as what the US dolphin-safe provisions define it to mean.58 The discrepancies 
between the meaning of this term under the measures and consumer perceptions 
may create confusion and undermine the ability of the measure to effectively 
ensure that consumers are not misled.   
 
The Panel noted the numerous studies that suggest that various adverse impacts 
can arise from setting on dolphins, beyond observed mortalities,59 but also other 
studies that question these conclusions. The Panel stated that further study would 
be required in order to draw overall conclusions, confirming that the information 
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available in this respect is incomplete and that this issue warrants additional 
analysis.60  
 
Our findings take into account the information, including scientific information concerning the 
effects of tuna fishing on dolphins that is available to us for the purposes of these proceedings.  
From these elements, it appears that a number of aspects of this issue are not fully documented 
and that further research may be necessary in order to ascertain the exact situation in various 
areas.61 
 
Ultimately, the Appellate Body reversed these Panel findings, disagreeing that the 
measure at issue was more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil US legitimate 
objectives, thus inconsistent with Article 2.2. Instead, the Appellate Body 
determined that the alternative measure proposed by Mexico (AIDCP ‘dolphin 
safe’ labelling combined with the existing US standard) would contribute to both 
the consumer information objective and the dolphin protection objective, to a 
lesser degree than the measure at issue.  
 
Mexico’s failure to justify its arguments in front of the Appellate Body, was likely 
due to its lack of ability to provide any quantitative evidence to support its claims. 
Simply stating a hypothetical less trade restrictive alternative, without providing 
empirical support that it is reasonably available, or that it is less trade restrictive, 
was insufficient. Taking the complementary approach using an econometric 
analysis may have been found to be more beneficiary to support Mexico’s 
argument. Such an analysis should have focused on the adverse effects of the 
labelling measure along with the US standard on the behaviour of consumers, and 
eventually proving that it could achieve a similar level of consumer information 
and dolphin protection as US’s stated objective. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper has provided a comparison of the legal and economic assessments used 
in GATT Article XX(b), Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement and Article 2.2 of the 
TBT Agreement. Particularly, it displays the selection of methodologies which 
were undertaken in various dispute settlements, to analyse the “necessity” of the 
selected measure at achieving the objective/ perused, evaluate the ‘trade 
restrictiveness’ which the policy measure imposes, as well as assess the availability 
of alternative less trade restrictive policy measures. Since despite the substantial 
importance and centrality of the term ‘trade-restrictiveness’ in DSM, its definition 
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 and exact scope still remain unclear, we aim to identify the arsenal of practices that 
the WTO tribunals use in determining its meaning and justified extent.  
 
The main conclusions are as follows: First, despite minor differences, in general, 
the legal assessments are noticeably similar. The same cannot be said regarding the 
application of quantitative assessments of the various measures, which fall under 
these provisions. Second, rarely any of the parties in the disputes support their 
arguments using empirical modelling and quantification of the trade restrictiveness 
of the chosen measures, nor a quantitative comparison to less trade restrictive 
alternative measures. Third, in the few cases where the parties do provide such 
evidence, it is often rejected by the tribunal, which explicitly express its concerns 
and lack of trust in these methodologies. Much of this reluctance is explained on 
the grounds of the reliability and accuracy of the data, the specifications and 
control variables included the regressions or the robustness of the findings. These 
justifications may explain the tribunals’ rulings, however, the insufficient trust or 
lack of acquaintance with the recent economic progress, still remain at the heart of 
the underuse of economic assessments by the parties themselves.  
 
Finally, the significant advancements in international trade theory as well as in 
analytical methodologies assessing the trade restrictiveness of policies, is of great 
benefit to WTO tribunals. It may reduce uncertainty and promote a more 
consistent approach regarding assessments required in GATT/WTO trade 
disputes. In the paper, we provide various examples of studies from the economic 
literature, which are directly related to the particular DS cases mentioned, and 
highlight the benefits of implementing quantitative methodologies. Such valuable 
experience in quantifying the extent to which a given policy measure or alternative 
measure would contribute to a given non-trade policy objective, may provide 
coherent guidelines to on-going and possibly future WTO disputes. Moreover, 
unless the Panel/Appellate Body are prepared to assess the key conceptual 
economic approach in their proceedings, they may potentially risk resulting in 
economic outcomes that ultimately undermine the original objectives of the WTO 
agreements. 
 
